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Cloning: Legal, Medical, 
Ethical and Social Issues 
Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Health and Environment 
of the Committee on Commerce 
U.S. House of Representatives 
February 12, 1998 
The Written Testimony of 
Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D. 
Dr. Irving is a lecturer in philosophy at The Catholic University of 
America, Washington, D.C In the text that follows, she has added 
emphasis to aid those lay readers unfamiliar with technical 
terminology. In addition to the following, Dr. Irving initially 
presented a verbal summary to the Committee Members. 
Chairman Bilirakis and Members of the Sub-Committee on Health and 
Environment, I appreciate the invitation to testify before you today on the 
profound and critically important issue of human cloning, and am grateful 
that you are so diligently addressing and pursuing the information 
necessary upon which to ground a clear and defensible public policy in this 
area.' 
I would like to emphasize that what I have to say today is not 
simply a matter of my own opinion; nor is it a religious or theological 
position, nor grounded on any "faith" or " belief' system. To the contrary, 
it is directly based on fully referenced, objectively known sc ientific facts -
scientific facts which anyone can ascertain simply by going to their local 
library. 
The bottom-line question concerning human cloning - not just by 
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means of nuclear transfer, but by any other technique of cloning as well -
is, "What is the immediate product of human cloning?" If the product of 
human cloning is a tomato, a head of lettuce, a frog or a giraffe, then our 
concerns about using that product for destructive experimental research or 
for commercial purposes would be quite different than if the product of 
human cloning is a human being. And simply because we can do 
something technically does not make it ethical to actually do it. Utilitarian 
ethics would argue that great advances could be made to cure diseases, to 
increase our scientific knowledge or to reap great fortunes in the 
commercial marketplace. But even goals agreed to be truly beneficent and 
genuinely good are simply not sufficient in the determination of what is 
ethical research. The means used to reach those beneficent goals must be 
ethical as well. If the means used involve the harm and destruction of 
human beings, or the denigration of their inherent human dignity, then such 
research and commercialization would be unethical. 
A point of clarity first. The question as to when a human embryo, 
or human being, begins, is strictly a scientific question, and should not be 
relegated to bioethicists, philosophers, theologians, governmental agencies 
or politicians. The answer to this question is simple. There is 
unquestionably a scientific consensus that the life of every single individual 
human being begins at fertilization as a single-cell human embryo (the 
zygote). I have included in my written testimony scores of scientific 
footnotes and references, from many different, highly acclaimed and the 
most commonly used human embryology text books, and have included the 
xeroxed pages from a number of these text books with my written 
testimony to demonstrate this scientific fact. What is true of the product of 
fertilization is true of the product of human cloning. 
The question as to when a human person begins is a 
philosophical question . I have included for the record several of my 
articles discussing this at length, demonstrating that " personhood" must 
begin when the human being begins - at fertilization (or, cloning). I will 
only refer briefly to the personhood (or philosophical) issue at the end of 
my testimony. 
Many people (including members of Congress) have been 
thoroughly confused by the bioethics literature that the product of 
fertilization - or in this case, the product of human cloning - is not a 
human embryo, a human being, or a human person .2 Elaborate scientific 
arguments have been flooding the bioethics literature for some years now, 
positing such unscientific claims as the foll owing. 
It is argued that fertilizati on (or, likewise, cloning) is not the 
beginning of a human embryo or of a human being; it is just a "blob" or 
May, 1999 27 
piece of the mother's tissues. At most what is there is only a "potential" or 
a "possible" human being. Fr. Bedate and Dr. Cefalo agree, claiming that 
all of the genetic information specific for a human being is not present at 
fertilization, and that human embryos can give rise to teratomas or 
hydatidiform moles, and therefore are not even "human" at alI.) 
Many have argued that fertilization (or cloning) may be the 
beginning of a human being but not the beginning of a human person (a 
philosophical or theological claim grounded on incorrect science). They 
have literalIy invented a new term called the "pre-embryo" to designate 
the product of fertilization (and now, cloning) from fertilization to 
implantation (5-6 days) or the formation of the primitive streak (14 days). 
What is present during this early period is only a "potential" or a "possible" 
human person or individual - and "individuality" is required, they say, 
before there can be personhood. For example, Dr. Clifford Grobstein (who 
is an amphibian embryologist, and not a human embryologist) and Fr. 
Richard McCormick, SJ . (a theologian) make the "scientific" claim that a 
geneticalIy human being is present at fertilization, but it is not a human 
individual as yet (because it could still become more than one individual), 
and therefore not a human person as yet - it is just a "pre-embryo". To 
support this scientific myth they make the folIowing "scientific" claims. 
To begin its growth, the human pre-embryo divides exponentially (i.e., 
1,2,4, 16,32,etc.). All of the outer trophoblast cells from the 5-6 day 
blastocyst are discarded after birth ; only the cells from the inner 
embryoblast layer become the future adult. Therefore, the 5-6 day 
blastocyst is really a "pre-embryo", not an embryo (which doesn ' t begin, 
they say, until about 14 days, or the formation of the primitive streak -
others argue similarly for about three weeks after fertilization) . Further, 
these early totipotent cells are only a " loose collection of cells", and "have 
not decided yet how many individuals they will be". And most influential, 
they claim that twinning cannot take place after 14 days, so 14 days must 
be the beginning of a human individual, and therefore, of a human person. 
The early human "pre-embryo", then, is not a true human embryo or a 
human " individual", and therefore not a true human person yet.4 
This is precisely the " science", by the way, which the N.I.H. 
Human Embryo Research Panel referenced in their Report to ground their 
conclusion that the "pre-embryo" or " pre-implantation embryo" (a 
legitimate term they use to mean the same as the "pre-embryo"), has a 
" reduced" moral status - and therefore it can be used in destructive 
experimental research . (It is interesting that there was not even one single 
human embryologist present on that N.I.H . PaneI5). This is also precisely 
the "science" currently being used in the cloning debates in Congress to 
28 Linacre Quarterly 
argue that the product of cloning is only a potential human embryo or 
human being, and therefore can be used in destructive experimentation to 
find cures for human diseases, etc. 
The Australian theologian, Fr. Norman Ford, who wrote the book 
When Did I Begin?, so influential in bioethics and currently used as a 
scientific resource in the American pharmaceutical industry, agrees with 
the scientific claims of Fr. McCormick and Dr. Grobstein, adding to their 
"science" his own claim that full differentiation is not even completed until 
14 days.6 Finally, some, e.g. , MacKay, Rahner, Ruff, Haring, Hans-Martin, 
Sass, Singer and Wells - most of whom are philosophers or theologians -
argue that true "personhood" is not present until "brain-birth", i.e. , the 
formation of the primitive streak, the nerve-net, the neocortex or the whole 
brain integrating system.7 
On the contrary, a human embryo or a human being begins at 
fertilization (or cloning). This human being, who is a single-cell human 
embryo or zygote, is not a "potential" or "possible" human being, but is an 
already existing human embryo, which is an already existing human 
being - with the "potential" or " possibility" to simply grow and develop 
bigger and bigger. Scientifically, there is no change in what it is, or its 
nature, once the single-cell human embryo or human being is formed. One 
can easily verity that scientifically as well (and therefore all arguments for 
delayed personhood are scientifically negated). 
The correct scientific facts about which there is a scientific 
consensus are the following. Human life is biologically a continuum which 
has not halted or been interrupted for thousands of years. Although this 
continuum may be seen by some to be just a "process", it must be pointed 
out that there must be something there which is undergoing the "process". 
For example, "childhood" is a "process", yet no one would seriously argue 
that there is no child present which is undergoing that process. Similarly, 
fertilization (or cloning) is a process; but there is something which is 
undergoing that process. A human sperm or ovum, a kidney cell , or a liver, 
may be said to have human " life", but the real issue is that they are not 
human beings, capable themselves of directing and sustaining the 
continuum of human life. One could implant any of these in a uterus and 
they would simply rot. Only human beings can direct and sustain the 
continuum of human life and transmit it. Once a skin cell has been used in 
cloning, a change in natures has taken place. That is, it is no longer a skin 
cell ; it has been changed into a human being. It no longer acts or functions 
as a skin cell; it now acts and function s as a human being (we know this 
scientifically). This is precisely the difference between a skin cell and the 
product of human cloning. 
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To scientifically determine if the immediate product of fertilization 
or cloning is a human embryo or a human being, all one has to do is count 
the number of chromosomes under a microscope, and particularly observe 
the functions and activities which are present immediately at fertilization or 
cloning (since scientists know that a thing acts or functions according to 
what it is). Fertilization or cloning does not produce a "blob" or piece of 
tissue of the mother, or a "drug". In fertilization , when the 23 
chromosomes of the sperm and the 23 chromosomes of the ovum are 
combined, a new, genetically unique, living, individual, already existing 
single-cell human embryo or human being (the single-cell human zygote) 
with 46 chromosomes (the number and quality specific for the human 
species)8 is formed, and this human being has the capacity itself to direct 
all of its further growth and development. Although this means that the 
human embryo is an already existing human being, the chromosomal 
makeup of the single-cell human embryo is qualitatively different from that 
of either the mother or the father. That is, the genetic identity of the human 
embryo is different from the genetic identity of the tissues of the mother. 
The same would be true of the product of cloning, as the genetic makeup of 
the new human embryo, although an already existing human being, would 
be qualitatively different from the genetic makeup of the donor "mother" 
(due, e.g. , to crossing-over of the maternal chromosomes during mitosis 
and cell division, environmental conditions, mutations, etc.). In 
fertilization, the single-cell human embryo formed at fertilization is already 
genetically a male or a female; in cloning, it would already be genetically a 
female. 9 In beginning its growth, the human embryo divides 
asynchronously (i.e., 1,2,3,etc.).lo 
Immediately specifically human enzymes and proteins are formed 
(not tomato, lettuce or giraffe proteins and enzymes). Specifically human 
tissues and organs are formed (tomato, lettuce, or giraffe ti ssues or organs 
are not formed - that is a scientific fact) . 1 1 Virtually all of the genetic 
information this human being will ever have or need is present immediately 
at fertilization or cloning. No new genetic information is gained or lost 
throughout development - only the use of some information is lost through 
mechanisms such as methylation. 12 This original genetic information 
"cascades" throughout the course of human development, determining later 
molecular information, tissue and organ formation ; 13 and it includes the 
genetic information needed for differentiation,14 totipotency (in which the 
cells are already expressing differentiation)1 5 and all of the processes of 
human embryogenesis - sometimes even twinning. Entities such as 
teratomas and hydatidiform moles do not arise from genetically normal 
human embryos, but from abnormal embryos to begin with (e.g. , 
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dispermy).16 
Further, the "pre-embryo" is a sCientific myth. Scientifically we 
know that all of the cells from the trophoblast layer are not all discarded 
after birth, but many from the yolk sac and allantois are incorporated into 
the embryo-proper as the early blood cells and the primordium of the 
primitive gut, and in the human adult as the median umbilical ligament and 
blood cells. I? Twinning is possible after /4 days and the formation of the 
primitivf streak - indeed, months after fertilization - e.g., with fetus-in-
fetu twins and with Siamese or conjoined twins. ls 
The term "pre-embryo" has a very interesting history, but has now 
been rejected by all human embryologists, including the internationally 
renowned human embryologist Ronan O ' Rahilly, who himself literally 
developed the internationally recognized Carnegie Stages of human 
embryological development. O ' Rahilly has published that the term "pre-
embryo" is "scientifically inaccurate" and erroneous, and states in his own 
human embryology textbook that he refuses to use the term. 19 The N .I.H. 
Panel - whose conclusions, and the grounding for those conclusions, 
received unusually harsh responses and reviews even within bioethics itself 
- gave up using the term (but retained the use of the term "pre-
implantation" embryo to mean the same as the term "pre-embryo")?O 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(A.C.O.G .), who along with several others have marketed the term "pre-
embryo" for many years, has recently and reluctantly decided to go back to 
the scientifically accurate term "embryo" for the immediate product of 
fertilization (or cloning). A.C.O.G. also reluctantly agreed to drop its drive 
to define the " beginning of pregnancy" as implantation, after quite a 
scientific outcry from within its own membership as well as from 
colleagues outside of the organization. " Pregnancy" is correctly defined 
scientifically as beginning at fertilization. 21 Unfortunately, N.I.H .' s federal 
OPRR regulations22 and Common Rule, which regulate the use of human 
subjects in research, still (in several revisions since 1981) contain the 
scientifically incorrect definitions of " pregnancy" as beginning at 
implantation (5-6 days after fertilization) , and of " fetus" as also beginning 
at implantation (the fetal period actually does not begin until the ninth 
week after fertilization 23). Keith Moore, also not a human embryologist, 
but often quoted by McCormick, Grobstein and others, has agreed in 
writing that the term " pre-embryo", which he had just used for the first time 
in the 5th edition of his human development text book, was scientifically 
incorrect, and that he would have it removed in the next printings?4 Even 
Clifford Grobstein admitted to a scientific audience that he was using frog 
embryology and just calling it human embryology.25 
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And finally , there is no scientific physiological basis for a valid 
parallel between " brain death" and "brain birth", "sentience", or self-
consicousness.26 Full human development, especially brain and nervous 
system development, and full brain integration,27 and the actual exercising 
of what bioethicists call " rational attributes" and "sentience" are not 
complete until young adulthood.28 
In sum, the answer to the first question, the scientific question, is 
simple and clear: the life of every human embryo and human being begins 
immediately at fertilization, or at cloning. Indeed, human cloning is 
essentially human embryo research. Thus cloning would be one ingenious 
way in which to by-pass or circumvent the current Congressional ban on 
human embryo research. The human embryo at fertilization or cloning is 
immediately an already existing, new, unique, individual human being -
termed by scientists the single-cell human zygote. This is a scientific Jact. 
And this is the way human beings are supposed to look at this stage of 
development. This is not a religious, theological or philosophical issue, nor 
a matter of anyone's belief system or opinion . Anyone - scientist or 
otherwise - who claims that this is not true or accurate, is scientifically 
wrong, and should be required to give extensive scientific proofs based 
only on the work of nationally and internationally recognized human 
embryologists - especially if such critically important public policy is to be 
explicitly based on it. 
It would seem to me that public policy should only be based on the 
correct scientific Jacts. I would conclude, therefore, on scientific grounds 
alone, that the cloning or commercialization of any human beings should be 
banned - both publicly and privately - since human cloning and its 
commercialization necessarily and immediately produces human bejngs 
(which remain human beings whether implanted or not), and is essentially 
human embryo research. Human cloning and commercialization must by 
definition be unethical since the means used result in harm to and 
destruction of untold numbers of innocent human beings - human beings 
used solely as objects for someone else's goals - no matter how lofty those 
goals may be. Technology would then surely be master of man, rather than 
man master of technology. 
The last question is, " when does a human person begin?,,29 As 
with public policy, any philosophical analysis of personhood must begin 
with and be based on the correct scientific facts. This is required for 
philosophical realism. Further, a thing acts or functions according to the 
kind of nature it has - or what it is . If a "human being" is a " rational 
animal"; if the term "rational" must include virtually the vegetative and 
sensitive powers; if all of its powers must be present simultaneously with 
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the body, with no splits - then personhood must begin when the human 
being begins - at fertilization, or cloning - when the "matter" is already 
"appropriately organized". This actually matches the correct science: 
immediately at fertilization or cloning, specifically human enzymes and 
proteins are produced, and specifically human tissues and organs are 
continuously developed from fertilization or cloning on. Personhood, then, 
should be based on what something is, not on how one actually thinks or 
feels (merely functional definitions of a human person). 
Yet other philosophical answers have been offered - based 
essentially on functionalism and on bioethics ' rendition of philosophical 
rationalism or empiricism.3o The question must be, do those arguments for 
"delayed" personhood square with or match the correct scientific facts; are 
they based on historically correct philosophical claims, or even 
philosophical claims which are theoretically or practically defensible, or 
logically valid and sound? Where does this bioethics logic take us? I 
and many others have demonstrated that these arguments have consistently 
and extensively used incorrect science, do not match the correct scientific 
facts, and are often historically inaccurate and philosophically indefensible 
(e.g., contain a mind/body split). In fact, none of the conclusions of these 
arguments even follow logically from their major and minor premises. It 
would seem that philosophical, theological or purely political 
presuppositions have been imposed on the scientific data. And if the true 
scientific data does not match, then it is simply changed accordingly. 
Of equal concern is where we would end up as a society if that 
bioethics logic is pushed. If either "sentience" (the ability to feel pain and 
pleasure) or " rational attributes" (willing, choosing, loving, self-
consciousness, the ability to relate to the world around us, etc.) are the 
rationale for human "personhood", then newborns, young children, 
Alzheimers and Parkinson patients, alcoholics, drug addicts, street people, 
runaways, the mentally ill and retarded, the depressed, the frail elderly, 
comatose patients, paraplegics and other patients with paralysis, patients in 
a persistent vegetative state - perhaps even teen-agers or politicians - (to 
name but a few) are not ··persons " either, and thus, by the same logic, 
could be "disposed of' or experimented on at will. Indeed, the Australian 
philosopher Peter Singer (whose book, oddly enough, was the only 
reference used to ground the N.I.H . Human Embryo Research Panel ' s 
scientific charts) has used such arguments to justifY the infanticide of 
normal healthy infants (because they do not exercise high levels of 
"rational attributes" or "sentience" - yet the higher primates, e.g., pigs, 
dogs, gorillas, etc. , do, says Singer, and therefore he claims these animals 
are "persons,,).31 Philosopher Richard Frey,32 correctly following Singer' s 
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logic, has published that many adult human beings on the above list are not 
persons because they do not actively exercise "rational attributes" or 
"sentience"; therefore they should be substituted for the higher primates, 
e.g., pigs, dogs, gorillas, etc. - who are persons - in destructive 
experimental research. Norman Fost has argued that anencephalic 
newborns are "brain dead", and therefore we could take their organs for 
transplantation while they are alive. He has also argued that the 
"cognitively impaired" are "brain dead" (and one wonders if that means 
that their organs can be taken while alive as well). And so the logic goes. 
Not only scientists, but also philosophers, theologians and 
bioethicists must be held to the same degree of accountability for their 
"expertise", especially when their "theories" on personhood would in any 
way be used to ground public policy. My guess is that they could never 
withstand such Congressional scrutiny. Thank you. 
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